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ABSTRACT:  
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Master thesis 
20 points 
 
Supervisor 
Hans Henrik Lidgard 
 
Intellectual Property Law 
 
 
Spring 2007 
Contents 
SUMMARY 4 
PREFACE 5 
ABBREVIATIONS 6 
1 INTRODUCTION 7 
1.1 Purpose and delimitations 8 
1.2 Method and material 8 
1.3 Outline 9 
2 SOFTWARE PATENTS 10 
2.1 Definitions 10 
2.1.1 Software and computer programs 10 
2.1.2 Computer-implemented inventions and software patents 11 
2.1.3 Relation to copyright 12 
2.1.4 Summary 12 
2.2 Software patents under the European Patent Convention 13 
2.2.1 Requirements for patentability 13 
2.2.2 Development through case law 14 
2.2.2.1 Vicom 14 
2.2.2.2 IBM/Document abstracting and retrieving 15 
2.2.2.3 IBM/Computer program product I 15 
2.2.2.4 PBS Partnership and Hitachi 16 
2.2.3 Summary 17 
2.3 The economics of software patents 17 
2.3.1 Information as a public good 18 
2.3.2 Information goods under free competition and monopoly 19 
2.3.3 Summary 20 
2.4 The software industry 21 
3 ”TRIVIAL” SOFTWARE PATENTS 23 
3.1 What is a “trivial” patent? 23 
3.2 Inventive step 24 
3.2.1 Person skilled in the art 25 
3.2.2 Problem and solution approach 26 
3.2.3 Secondary indicia 27 
 2 
3.3 Disclosure and diffusion of technology 28 
4 PROPOSED CII DIRECTIVE 29 
5 SOFTWARE PATENTS IN US LAW 31 
5.1 General patentability criteria 31 
5.2 Patentability of software 32 
6 ANALYSIS 34 
6.1 Incentives for innovation 35 
6.1.1 Appropriate level of inventive step 35 
6.1.2 Incremental innovation 37 
6.2 Clarity of rules for legal certainty 37 
6.3 Examination procedure 39 
6.3.1 The examiner 39 
6.3.2 The man skilled in the art 40 
6.3.3 Search for prior art 41 
6.3.4 Ex ante vs. ex post control 42 
6.4 Competition concerns 42 
6.5 The role of harmonization 43 
7 CONCLUSIONS 46 
SUPPLEMENT 49 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 51 
TABLE OF CASES 54 
 3 
Summary 
Computer programs are excluded subject matter “as such” under the EPC. 
However, once “technical character” can be established in a software 
invention, and it fulfills all the requirements for patentability – being an 
invention, which is novel, has inventive step and is industrially applicable – 
software is very much patentable. The technical character requirement was 
originally connected to the invention criteria, but has been appropriately 
moved towards being part of the assessment for inventive step. Inventive 
step is concerned with the level of novelty required for a good quality 
patent. A patent lacking inventive step, but which is nonetheless granted, is 
called a “trivial” patent – which means “novel but lacking inventive step”. 
 
Patents should provide incentives for innovation and facilitate for diffusion 
of technology that offset the negative effects the exclusive rights of patents 
have on competition. Therefore it is essential that granted software patents 
uphold a certain level of quality. Trivial patents are detrimental to 
innovation as they skew innovation incentives by, e.g. facilitating for an 
excessive amount of patent applications for low quality inventions and thus 
crowding the patent offices with work. Something that, in turn, requires a 
high level of skill of the patent examiners to “sort” the good from the bad. 
These problems are heightened by the current inability at the patent offices 
to keep up to date with the fast moving pace of the development in the 
software industry and a somewhat inconsistent application of patent law to 
software.  
 
The solution of the trivial patent problem, in my opinion, must be to look at 
the possibility of making amendments to the current assessment procedure 
of inventive step in software inventions rather than putting up a ban against 
them. Raising the standard of inventiveness required, but also granting the 
patent offices some more time to adjust to this fairly new field of technology 
would help. Furthermore, harmonization of software patent law on the EU 
level, possibly along the lines of what was proposed in the CII Directive, 
would make for more conform and predictable assessment of inventive step 
in software inventions, thus providing for legal certainty. 
 
In conclusion, there is no need for a prohibition on software patents, which 
are already allowable, or for strong opposition towards harmonization. The 
best step forward is to facilitate for an improved examination procedure, 
which will be better achieved through harmonization, rather than without it. 
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Abbreviations 
ABS  Anti-lock Braking System 
CAFC  United States Court of Appeals of the Federal 
Circuit 
CD  Compact Disc 
CII(s)  Computer-Implemented Invention(s) 
DVD  Digital Versatile Disc 
EC  European Community 
EP  European Parliament 
EPO  European Patent Office 
EPC  European Patent Convention 
EU  European Union 
ICT  Information and Communication Technology 
IP  Intellectual Property 
IPR(s)  Intellectual Property Right(s) 
OS  Operating System 
R&D  Research and Development 
UK  United Kingdom 
US  United States 
U.S.C. United States Code 
USPTO United States Patent and Trademark Office 
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Organization 
 6 
1 Introduction 
Today, the patentability of software is a hot topic at the European Patent 
Office (EPO) and in the European Union (EU). Despite the rejection of the 
proposed Directive for computer-implemented inventions (CIIs) by the 
European Parliament (EP) in 2005,1 the lively debate has persisted. The 
attention given to software patents is not surprising in light of a steady 
increase in claims for them, and that, over the past few years, it is the 
category of patent applications that has had the highest growth rate. The 
main aim of the EPO, when granting patents, is to distinguish genuine 
technological innovations from ones that are mere variations on existing 
products and processes. This makes it increasingly important to ensure the 
quality of claims for software patents.2 High quality in patents in the 
information and communication technology (ICT) industry, including 
software, is also recognized as one of the top priorities of the European 
patent system.3
 
Demanding a certain level of inventiveness in patent-protected subject 
matter is essentially a question of demanding quality. Opponents of software 
patents are of the opinion that the nature of software, and the software 
industry, is not well suited for patent protection. Furthermore, it is claimed 
that it is not possible to maintain a high level of quality in software patents, 
leaving the market with an excessive amount of “trivial” patents, i.e. patents 
upholding an insufficient level of inventive step. That, in turn, will 
inevitably hamper innovation in the software industry, since it cannot 
provide appropriate incentives for innovation. This may also lead to 
competition concerns because, e.g. the exclusive rights provided by patents 
in combination with low quality software may block development of 
superior products and processes. Proponents, on the other hand, are 
convinced innovation will not be restricted by patents and that they in fact, 
as long as high quality is demanded, will help the industry progress. 
Opinions clearly differ greatly between both sides, and at this point no 
common ground seems to be in sight. 
 
This thesis means to take a closer look at how software patents are treated 
under the European patent system today, especially with regards to the 
assessment for inventive step and its implications for the quality of granted 
patents. Furthermore, what may be done to improve the quality of patents 
                                                 
1 European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Council Common Position With a 
View to the Adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Patentability of Computer-implemented Inventions (CII Directive).  
2 http://www.epo.org/focus/issues/computer-implemented-inventions.html. 
3 Speech/06/453, Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and 
Services, Closing Remarks at Public Hearing on Future Patent Policy, public discussion on 
future patent policy in Europe, Brussels, July 12, 2006, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/453&format=HTML
&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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granted and the possible impact of EU-level harmonization in the field will 
be evaluated.  
1.1 Purpose and delimitations 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate whether the problem of granting 
“trivial” software patents provides a valid argument for the continued non-
harmonization of patentability of computer software in EC law.  
 
To find a possible solution to this problem, a number of questions present 
themselves: 
- What are “trivial” patents, what is problematic about them, and what 
are the consequences of granting them?  
- What implications do trivial software patents have on incentives to 
innovate?  
- What is entailed in the concept of inventive step, why is it important, 
and how is a sufficient level of inventive step ensured by patent 
examiners at the EPO?  
- What are the economic aspects that have to be considered?  
- What possible properties does the software industry have that makes 
patenting more controversial than in other industries?  
 
The discussion of this thesis will be limited to patents on computer 
programs/software, as defined in Section two, in a European context. US 
patent law will be used for comparative reasons and for illustrative 
purposes. 
1.2 Method and material 
Traditional legal method will be used for assessing the laws and case law 
concerning patents and computer programs/software on the European level, 
to paint a picture of how the state of software patent law has developed and 
what it looks like today. Moreover, it will be used in developing a sense of 
how inventive step is assessed. A descriptive analysis will be used for 
explaining key concepts and basic economic theories under which much of 
patent law should be evaluated. This approach will furthermore be used for 
the section on the proposed CII Directive. 
 
A law and economics perspective will be taken on the laws concerning 
patentability of software and the economic implications of “trivial” software 
patents. Intellectual property (IP) law in general, and patent law in 
particular, is much affected by economic considerations, which makes it 
appropriate to take this perspective into consideration. 
 
For the section on US software patent law a comparative perspective will be 
taken. However, this will only serve explanatory ends and does not intend to 
be anything more than an overview for illustrative purposes.  
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The European Patent Convention (EPC), its Guidelines (EPO Guidelines)4 
and the case law of the EPO Boards of Appeal provide the legal framework 
upon which this thesis is based. Furthermore, there is a large amount of 
articles written on different aspects of this topic. However, many of them 
are colored by strong, idealistic arguments, something that has been taken 
into consideration when assessing the material. For the section on US 
software patent law, legal texts and case law will be summarized, and the 
literature used has been chosen because it provides for general comments on 
patentability and software in the US system.  
1.3 Outline 
Section two will present certain definitions of specific terms used in the 
software field. The legal framework will then be provided for an overview 
of the requirements for patentability and the state of the law as it is today in 
the European patent system, as stated in the EPC and the way it has been 
developed through case law. Furthermore, the economics of software 
patents and the particular characteristics of the software industry will be 
presented. 
 
Section three will go on to explain the concept of “trivial” patents and what 
problems may arise when they are granted. Moreover, the patentability 
criteria of inventive step will be presented and elaborated on in more detail. 
 
Section four will give a brief summary of the proposed CII Directive for that 
was rejected by the European Parliament in 2005. Section five will then 
provide for a brief comparison with the legal development and current 
practice for software patents in the US. 
 
Section six will analyze what has been found in the previous sections, from 
which the conclusions presented in Section seven will be drawn. 
                                                 
4 Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office (EPO Guidelines). 
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2 Software Patents 
2.1 Definitions 
The terms computer program, software and computer-implemented 
invention may not always be clearly distinct from each other, creating some 
confusion on what is meant by what. This part will explain the different 
concepts, what they entail, and how they relate to each other. 
2.1.1 Software and computer programs 
Both computer programs and software are forms of what is a major part of 
technology, generally known as information technology. Software, 
however, is a larger concept than computer programs, because, e.g. software 
may be used on other hardware than computers.5 A computer program, as 
the name indicates, is run on a computer. Examples of computer programs 
are e-mail programs, word processors and anti-virus programs, whereas 
examples of software are operating systems (OS), DVDs, CDs and 
databases. Notably, all the examples of computer programs are also 
software, but the software examples are not all computer programs.  
 
Software is  
 
“a composite term comprising all the material required by a computer 
user to operate and control a computer including the program, 
program description and supporting material.”6  
 
Simply put, the software is used to give instructions to the hardware; the 
hardware reads the instructions provided by the software and performs the 
task assigned by the instructions. Computer programs may be defined as  
 
“a set of instructions capable, when incorporated in a machine 
readable medium of causing a machine having information processing 
capabilities to indicate, perform or achieve a particular function, task 
or result.”7  
 
Computer programmers make software or computer programs by designing 
algorithms. An algorithm is a “detailed sequence of actions intended to 
perform a specific task”8, i.e. a set of numeral instructions on how to carry 
                                                 
5 Hardware is for example a computer or CD-player. 
6 WIPO Model provisions on the protection of computer software, Geneva 1978. 
7 Id. 
8 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Patentability of Computer-implemented Inventions, COM(2002) 92 final, Explanatory 
memorandum, p. 7. 
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out a task, which can be applied in many different ways.9 After the 
algorithm is designed, the programmer writes computer source code, which 
describes the algorithm in purely functional terms.10 Then the source code is 
provided to a computer, which transcribes the code into object code that is 
not human-readable.11 Therefore, computer programs and software are, on 
their own, nothing more than representations of mathematical formulae, 
which makes them, as such, abstract and mental in nature.12 These features 
add to the complexity of software because it gives it attributes that are 
clearly nothing more than numbers, but on the other hand, skillfully 
handled, these numbers made into code may perform tasks that provide a 
completely new dimension to them.  
2.1.2 Computer-implemented inventions and 
software patents 
According to the EPO definition a computer-implemented invention is an 
expression intended to cover claims that involve computers, computer 
networks or other conventional programmable apparatus. The novel feature 
of the claimed subject matter should be realized by means of a program, 
meaning that if there is a part of the invention that is implemented by means 
of a computer, but that part is not the novel one, it is not a computer-
implemented invention.13 Computer programs are a form of computer-
implemented invention. The core part of a computer-implemented invention 
may lie in an apparatus, a system, an algorithm or method, the processing of 
data, a network or the software itself. Examples of products using computer-
implemented inventions are: mobile telephones, DVD players, aircraft 
navigation systems, and anti-lock braking systems (ABS).  
 
What is in literature, and will be herein, referred to as software patents, are 
in essence computer program related inventions, but not strictly computer-
implemented inventions. There is no formal definition of a software patent, 
however, it may be described as  
 
“patents that claims as all or substantially all of its invention some 
feature, function or process embodied in a computer program that is 
executed on a computer.”14  
 
The distinction between a computer-implemented invention and a software 
patent lies in that  
                                                 
9 Zoracki, Allen Clark – When is an Algorithm Invented? The Need for a New Paradigm for 
Evaluating an Algorithm for Intellectual Property Protection, 15 Albany Law Journal of 
Science and Technology 579, 2005, at 581. 
10 As opposed to structural terms, in which patent claims are written. 
11 Downing, Robbie – EC Information Technology Law, Wiley 1995, p. 10. 
12 Paterson, Gerald – The European Patent System – The Law and Practice of the European 
Patent Convention, 2nd Edition Sweet & Maxwell 2001, p. 418. 
13 EPO Guidelines, C-IV 2.3.6. 
14 Gratton, Éloïse – Should Patent Protection be Considered for Computer Software-related 
Innovations?, Computer Law Review & Technology Journal, Vol. VII 2003, p. 224.  
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“a software patent concerns an invention about a software-based 
computer implementation, while a computer-implemented invention is 
about an invention that may be implemented in software”.15
2.1.3 Relation to copyright 
Software has characteristics that make it susceptible to different types of IP 
protection; patents and copyright may both be utilized for protection of it. 
The two forms of IPRs do not, however, cover the same ‘part’ of the 
software. Copyright protects the source code in which the computer 
program is written, whereas patents protect the underlying idea or concept.16 
The Computer Program Directive clearly states that what is protected is 
merely the “expression” of the computer program and not the “[i]deas and 
principles which underlie any element of a computer program.”17 Patents 
therefore provide different and broader protection than copyright. 
Furthermore, the value of the software is often in the commercial potential 
of the product or process, which lies in what the program does and not in the 
code as such.18 Legal protection by copyright and patents may exist in a 
complimentary manner in software.19
2.1.4 Summary 
To summarize, the problem, essentially, is to make the distinction between 
the algorithms that the software is comprised of, which is protected by 
copyright, and the underlying idea, which is potentially covered by patent 
protection. It is also necessary to be aware of the difference between 
software and computer programs, the former being a larger concept 
covering more than the latter. Software patent is the term used for all CIIs 
and other patents covering software-related products. 
                                                 
15 Bergstra, Jan A. and Paul Klint – About “Trivial” Software Patents: The IsNot Case, 
Science of Computer Programming 64 (2007) 264-285, p. 277. 
16 The code is protected by Council Directive of May 1991 on the legal protection of 
computer programs 91/250/EEC (Computer Program Directive) OJ L122, 17.5.1991, which 
provides that all Member States must facilitate copyright protection for computer programs 
as literary works within the meaning of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works.  
17 Article 1(2), Computer Program Directive. 
18 Domeij, Bengt – Patenträtt – Svensk och Internationell Patenträtt, Avtal om Patent samt 
Skyddet för Växtsorter och Företagshemligheter, Iustus Förlag 2007, p. 61. 
19 It would also be possible to protect software by e.g. trade secret. 
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2.2 Software patents under the European 
Patent Convention 
European patents20 are granted by the EPO, which consists of the EPC21 and 
the national patent laws of the member states of the EPO.22 The EPO, 
through application of the EPC, accepts applications and grants patents on 
the European level. Once granted, the European patent will have the same 
effect as a nationally granted patent in the individual states.23 The European 
patents, post-grant, are turned into national patents, with the national patent 
laws applying to them. It should be pointed out that the EPC is not an EU 
instrument. 
2.2.1 Requirements for patentability 
Articles 52 and 53 of the EPC govern the nature of patentable inventions in 
the European patent system.24 The basic patentability considerations are in 
principle the same for software as for any other subject matter.25 There are 
four statutory criteria for patentability under the EPC. The primary 
requirement, which is separate from the other three, is the existence of an 
invention26. Additionally, inventions must, according to Article 52(1) EPC, 
be novel,27 include an inventive step28 and be susceptible to industrial 
application.29 Novelty means that the invention must not form part of the 
state of the art. Industrial application requires the inventions to, as the 
wording suggests, be industrially useable. The EPC does not define the 
word invention, however, in Article 52(2) it provides a non-exhaustive list 
of what is not to be regarded as inventions. The Article states what is 
excluded from patentability in the sense that the subject matter is either not 
regarded as an invention, or it is not an invention that is susceptible to 
industrial application, and therefore by definition not patentable.30 The 
principle behind these exclusions is that abstract and intellectual methods 
                                                 
20 “Patents granted by virtue of this Convention shall be called European patents.” Article 
2(1) EPC. 
21 The EPC is a special agreement within Article 19 of the Paris Convention and a regional 
patent treaty within the meaning of Article 45.1 of the Patent Cooperation Treaty.  
22 The contracting states of the EPO are all 27 EU Member States, Switzerland, Iceland, 
Lichtenstein, Monaco and Turkey. 
23 “The European Patent shall, in each of the Contracting States for which it is granted, 
have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by that 
State, unless otherwise provided in this Convention.” Article 2(2) EPC. 
24 Article 53 EPC describes what is exempted from patentability, which contains subject 
matter that is considered as inventions but which, with regard to public policy issues, 
cannot be patentable. 
25 EPO Guidelines, C-IV 2.3.6. 
26 Article 52(1) EPC; for full text see Supplement. 
27 Articles 52(1) and 54 EPC. 
28 Articles 52(1) and 56 EPC. 
29 Articles 52(1) and 57 EPC. 
30 Paterson, p. 405. 
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should not be patentable.31 Therefore, these excluded subject matters are 
only excluded where the patent application relates to them “as such”.32
 
An additional requirement for patentability not explicitly stated in the EPC, 
is that for technical character. In the case of subject matter excluded “as 
such” this requirement provides for a distinction between that and 
acceptable inventions. This approach to patentability stems form the 
national laws of the EPO contracting states and the subsequent confirmation 
in the practice of the Boards of Appeal.33 It may also be deduced from Rule 
27(1)(c) EPC,34 which states that the description must disclose the invention 
in such terms that the technical problem and its solution can be understood. 
Furthermore, Rule 29(1) EPC requires the claims to define the matter for 
which protection is sought in terms of the technical features of the 
invention. The concept of technical character has changed over time through 
its development in case law. When it was first mentioned in Vicom,35 it was 
mainly a factor taken into consideration when deciding on the subject matter 
being an invention or not. However, that approach has essentially been 
abandoned in favor of the assessment being part of the inventive step, but 
also as inherent in the notion of industrial applicability, because it implies a 
physical rather than abstract or mental nature.36 The technical contribution 
must in itself have inventive step.  
2.2.2 Development through case law 
Certain principles have been developed in the case law of the Boards of 
Appeal to help in the interpretation and understanding of the provisions of 
the Articles of the EPC that deal with excluded subject matter, and with the 
interpretation of the requirements for patentability. Of most importance here 
are the cases where the notions of “as such” and “technical character” have 
been elaborated on. In the field of software and CIIs, most case law 
concerns business methods, which is outside the scope of this thesis, but 
certain principles may be used in this area as well.  
2.2.2.1 Vicom 
How to understand and interpret the exclusion of computer programs from 
patentability was first tried in the Vicom case, although not strictly relating 
to computer programs, but a computer-implemented method of processing 
digitally encoded images. In Vicom, a distinction was for the first time made 
between subject matter providing an effect that is abstract (not patentable) 
and those with an effect that is technical (potentially patentable).37 The 
Board of Appeal stated that it was inappropriate to make a distinction 
                                                 
31 EPO Guidelines, C-IV 2.1. 
32 Article 52(3) EPC. 
33 Paterson, p. 409; For case law see e.g.: IBM/Document abstracting and retrieving 
(T22/85) O.J. EPO 1990, 12; [1990] E.P.O.R. 98. 
34 The Rules may be found in the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent 
Convention; For full text see Supplement. 
35 VICOM/Computer-related invention (T208/84) O.J. EPO 1987, 14; [1986] E.P.O.R. 74. 
36 Paterson, p. 410. 
37 VICOM/Computer-related invention, at reason 5.  
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between a process carried out in software or in hardware and that the 
decisive issue was whether there was a technical contribution made by the 
claim.38 A function-over-form approach was taken and the notion of 
“technical contribution” was introduced.  
 
The principles of the Vicom case was applied to computer programs in the 
IBM/Computer-related invention case:39  
 
“Even if the basic idea underlying an invention may be considered to 
reside in a computer program, a claim directed to its use in the 
solution of a technical problem cannot be regarded as seeking 
protection for the program as such within the meaning of Article 
52(2)(c) and (3) EPC.” 
2.2.2.2 IBM/Document abstracting and retrieving 
In the IBM/Document abstracting and retrieving case,40 the Board of 
Appeal elaborated on what the exclusions in Article 52(3) had in common, 
and concluded that it was that they did not aim at technical results, but were 
of abstract and intellectual character.41 The Board went on and settled that 
the requirement for technical character or technical contribution was 
inherent in the practice of the contracting states, and that this requirement 
was to be seen as implicit in the wording of the EPC.42
 
After the IBM/Document Abstracting and Retrieving case, the “contribution 
approach” began to be used for assessing technical character and 
contribution. The approach required the claimed subject matter’s 
contribution to the art to be of a technical character. The Boards of Appeal 
have subsequently in principle abandoned this approach in regards to using 
it for fulfillment of the requirement of subject matter being inventions.43  
2.2.2.3 IBM/Computer program product I 
In the IBM/Computer Program Product I44 it was concluded that computer 
programs cannot be considered as having technical character for the very 
reason that they are computer programs.45 It was also held that claims which 
read “a computer program in which…” are not considered claims for 
computer programs “as such”, and are thus allowable so long as the 
program, when running on a computer brings about, or is capable of 
bringing about, a technical effect which goes beyond the ‘normal’ physical 
interactions between the program (software) and the computer (hardware).  
                                                 
38 Id., at reasons 12 and 16. 
39 IBM/Computer-related invention O.J. EPO 1990, 30; [1990] E.P.O.R. 107. 
40 IBM/Document Abstracting and Retrieving; See fn 33. 
41 Id., at reason 2. 
42 Id., at reason 3.  
43 Booton, David – The Patentability of Computer-implemented Inventions in Europe, 
Intellectual Property Quarterly 2007, 1, 92-116, at 102; See e.g. PBS (fn 47) and Hitachi (fn 
50) cases.  
44 IBM/Computer Program Product I (T1173/97) O.J. EPO 1999, 609.  
45 Id., at reason 6.1. 
 15 
“As such” was construed to mean programs that are “mere abstract 
creations, lacking in technical character.”46
 
The case concluded that the ordinary interaction between software and 
hardware could not constitute technical effect because it would make all 
software patentable. Going beyond the ‘normal’ physical interactions means 
that there has to be a further technical effect, which may be in the form of 
the technical character of the effect, or if it causes the software to solve a 
technical problem. This case was the first in which the technical character of 
the invention was found in the computer program itself. 
2.2.2.4 PBS Partnership and Hitachi 
If the Board of Appeal in the IBM I case introduced the possibility of, and 
expressed its preference of that kind of proceeding, ‘moving’ the technical 
character assessment to that of inventive step, the PBS 
Partnership/Controlling pension benefits case47 took that reasoning one step 
further. First of all the Board stated that an activity carried out by a program 
does not have to be technical in itself. Furthermore, that technical means are 
used for a non-technical purpose does not necessarily mean that the subject 
matter has technical character. The contribution approach was said to be 
very closely related to examination with regard to the requirement of 
inventive step,48 so the contribution approach, although abandoned by the 
Boards of Appeal, took a new shape in the assessment of inventive step.49 
This case represents a shift in the reasoning of the Board of Appeal where it 
joined the requirements for inventive step and technical contribution 
together in a way that had not been done prior to this case.  
 
The Hitachi case50 took the reasoning from PBS one step further and the 
statement was made that all methods involving technical means are 
inventions within the meaning of the EPC. The Board of Appeal hereby 
reduced the requirement for an invention to any subject matter, or “any 
method”, using technical means.51 It was stated that in practice, the separate 
requirement for the claimed subject matter to be an invention is so easily 
satisfied that it is an insignificant bar to patentability. The only thing 
required is technical implementing means, which may very well be known 
in the prior art. Therefore, again it was pointed out that the assessment for 
inventive step was a more appropriate place for the technical character to be 
found. 
                                                 
46 Id., at reason 5.2. 
47 PBS Partnership/Controlling pension benefits (T931/95) O.J. EPO 2001, 10; [2000] 
E.P.O.R. 441. 
48 Id., at reason 7.  
49 Booton, at 103. 
50 Hitachi/Auction method (T258/03) O.J. EPO 2004, 12; [2004] E.P.O.R. 575. 
51 Id., at 4.7. 
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2.2.3 Summary 
For patentability under the EPC, there has to be an invention, which in turn 
is novel, contains an inventive step and that is industrially applicable. 
Furthermore, it has in the case law of the Boards of Appeal, been 
established that there is also need for the invention to have technical 
character. With regards to software, this technical character is essential for 
patentability, much because computer programs are not patentable “as such” 
under the EPC. The technical character has to be more than the mere 
interaction between computer program and computer. This assessment has 
been moved from being essential for the invention criteria to being a part of 
the inventive step requirement, a development that has had great 
implications especially in the field of software patents. 
2.3 The economics of software patents 
“Patent law essentially is economic law, and its merits must be judged 
primarily on economical terms.”52  
 
The patent system has economic considerations as its foundation and 
objective: to foster innovation and growth through encouragement of 
invention and diffusion of technology. This makes an economic approach to 
the patent law, and software patents, both reasonable and necessary. The 
economic perspective is a utilitarian view where patents should only be 
granted if they are beneficial to society. Moreover, the patents that are 
granted should be designed as to minimize the costs and maximize the 
benefits society can obtain.53 Strict economic theory may seem, at times, a 
bit separate from reality as it does not take into consideration such things as 
fairness or the inventors’ ‘natural’ rights to their inventions, rather than it 
being more efficient in terms of the welfare of society as a whole to grant 
exclusive rights.  
 
The question whether software patents provide incentives to innovate is 
important. The entire patent system is built on the idea that patents, despite 
their detrimental effects on competition and static efficiency, are needed to 
provide incentives to invent and by that bring dynamic efficiency. However, 
there is an important balance to be struck between providing these 
incentives and the promotion of competition on the market. The balance 
may be found in different adjustments to the patent system, and the way in 
which they are provided. One can adjust the duration or the breadth of the 
patents. However, what this thesis is concerned with is patent height; the 
proper level of novelty required from a software invention. The economic 
                                                 
52 Bakels, Reinier and P. Bernt Hugenholtz – EP Directorate-General for Research Working 
Paper – The Patentability of Computer Programmes Discussion of European-level 
Legislation in the Field of Patents for Software JURI 107 EN, p. 5. 
53 Guellec, Dominique and Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie – The Economics of the 
European Patent System – IP Policy for Innovation and Competition, Oxford University 
Press, p. 114. 
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theory at the foundation of patent law makes certain assumptions – first and 
foremost it is all about decision-making. The socially optimal level of any 
activity lies where the costs and benefits outweigh each other and the market 
is in equilibrium – i.e. where supply and demand are aligned, something that 
will only happen under specific conditions.54 However, the perfect 
condition – free competition – under which equilibrium may exist, never 
occurs in reality. There is always some level of market failure to take into 
consideration.  
 
The problem with the patent system first of all is that it provides the patent 
holder with a monopoly. Monopoly is the direct opposite of free 
competition, and is considered a market failure. However, there are also 
efficiency problems with having no patent system, problems which will be 
dealt with in the following. It is the task of the policy maker to weigh the 
negative and positive effects of the different sides and decide on how to 
make regulation correspond to what is optimal in regards to what society 
wants to obtain. It is also, to a great extent, a question of static vs. dynamic 
efficiency. Static efficiency is promoted by free competition in the market 
and is a here-and-now type of policy, whereas dynamic efficiency is a more 
long-term efficient use of policy, where some short-term restrictions may 
have to be incurred to gain the long-term goal of e.g. innovation. A tradeoff 
has to be made in this respect, as to what is to be regarded as more 
important, or at least how to balance the two. 
 
Applied to the software industry, what is sought after is an efficient level of 
innovation and a market where supply of innovation and demand of it is in 
equilibrium, which will, in turn, lead to maximized profit for companies and 
welfare for consumers, and society as a whole. This is, however, an 
unobtainable goal because perfect competition cannot exist and market 
failures are always present. It is a matter of making the best of the situation 
at hand. Incentives must be given to inventors to continue their endeavor if 
technological development is to progress. The problem is to know what 
those incentives are and how to balance them properly, to come as close to a 
perfectly competitive market as possible. 
2.3.1 Information as a public good 
A public good is a good that is non-rivalrous and non-excludable in nature. 
The classic example of a public good is military services, everyone can 
‘make use’ of it, but no one wants to pay since it will be there whether or 
not the individual contributes to it. Non-rival means that consumption by 
one person does not hinder the consumption of that very same good by 
someone else.55 An example of this would be a copy of the word processing 
computer program Microsoft Word; one person buys the program, runs it on 
his computer and uploads it to a file-sharing site for others to download 
without him losing any of the availability or utility of the program since it 
                                                 
54 Cooter, Robert and Thomas Ulen – Law and Economics, 3rd Edition 2000, pp. 11-12. 
55 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, p. 49.  
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has already been installed on his computer.56 Non-excludable means that it 
is next to impossible, or extremely costly (not worth it) to exclude anyone 
from making use of the good once it is known. E.g., it is almost impossible, 
and definitely very costly, for the developer of the computer program in the 
previous example to prohibit the user of it from sharing it with others. 
 
Software is an information good, which essentially has the same 
characteristics as public goods, plus the additional favorable feature of no 
congestion.57 Information is often expensive to produce and cheap to 
transmit. Buyers cannot determine the value of the good until they have it, 
and when they do they will not want to pay for it. Moreover, the buyer can 
easily transmit the good at transmission cost (and perhaps the cost of a 
guilty conscience).58 Look, e.g. to the example of non-rivalry in the 
previous paragraph where transmission cost is zero, or possibly the cost of 
five minutes worth of Internet access. This type of good therefore is prone 
to attract free riders; consumers who consume the good, but are not willing 
to pay for it. Conversely, producers cannot predict or appropriate the social 
value of the idea. They are additionally unable to exclude the free riders, 
who do not pay their share of the cost of the product. The producer will thus 
provide too little of the good, which creates deadweight loss and in turn 
causes inefficiencies that are detrimental to both the producer and the 
consumer.59
2.3.2 Information goods under free competition 
and monopoly 
Free competition has had to be supplemented with the patent system 
because, due to their public good nature, information goods will be supplied 
at an inefficiently low level under free competition.60 However, 
inefficiencies also occur under the monopoly provided by the same patent 
system that is there to mend inefficiencies, by ‘privatizing’ the public goods 
and making them excludable. It is not a simple task for the lawmaker to 
weigh the different aspects and interests to decide on a policy that has the 
least harmful effects on efficiency.  
 
The inefficiencies under free competition occur because the marginal cost of 
using information is zero. Therefore, the cost of invention is a sunk cost, 
one which must be incurred once, before the production of the invented 
good starts. This sunk cost cannot be returned to the inventor if competitors 
are free to take the information and start competing with the original 
                                                 
56 Obviously Microsoft has taken precautions against this type of illegal copying of their 
products by requiring complicated keys, but when searching a file-sharing site for 
‘Microsoft Word’ you will, in addition to the product, find files for pass keys etc. to be able 
to use the program on your computer.  
57 Cf. a public road, which is a public good, but will at a growing rate of users be ‘filled 
up’, thus making it less valuable to old and new users after a certain point. 
58 Cooter and Ulen, p. 126. 
59 Id., p. 128. 
60 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, p. 49. 
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inventor as soon as the product is put on the market. This would happen 
under free competition because information is so easily copied once it has 
been made public. A further problem for the original inventor is that he 
must charge a higher price than his competition to recoup the sunk costs, 
and will thus be driven out of the market by his competitors. Hence, he will 
not make the innovative effort in the first place, anticipating not being able 
to gain anything from it. However, re-invention of public goods is a waste 
of resources and unlimited and free access to them is socially preferable. 
‘Positive spillovers’ arise since the existing knowledge can be beneficial to 
others than the inventor. The social return of inventions is higher (an 
unlimited number of people can use it without it losing its value) than the 
private return, which will be too low (the inventor cannot appropriate the 
value of the invention to him). Due to the insufficient private returns, the 
innovation rate will be lower than socially optimal. So, the patent system is 
in place to make excludable the goods invented and to make it possible to, 
to some extent, have costs returned to the inventor to make him inclined to 
invent in the first place. However, the exclusive rights provided by patents 
generate costs, e.g. by reducing the positive spillovers.61
 
Furthermore, market equilibrium cannot be reached in a monopolistic 
market. When there is only one supplier, the holder of the patent, he can set 
prices that will not be subject to competition from others for that specific 
product, for the term of the patent, and thus the product will be produced at 
an inefficiently low level. Consumers are made to pay a price higher than 
the marginal cost of production, and some consumers who would be willing 
to pay at marginal cost will not be able to buy the good, as it will be 
supplied in too low quantities. Thus deadweight loss is created.62 
Seemingly, neither the patent system with the provision of exclusive rights, 
nor the situation without it with information as a public good, are able to 
bring efficiency on their own. It is therefore the not so simple task of the 
regulator to create a policy that makes the situation as good as it can be, by 
providing incentives for efficient behavior on part of both the inventor and 
the consumer. 
2.3.3 Summary 
Considerations of an economic nature have to be taken into account when 
assessing software patent law. First of all, patents makes for market failure 
in the form of monopoly, which should be avoided generally. However, 
because of the specific nature of IP, i.e. its public good nature, there would 
be market failure even without the patent. The crux is to find the right 
balance between negative effects inherent in the provision of the exclusive 
rights to the patent holder and the incentives the exclusive right gives for 
innovation.  
                                                 
61 Id., pp. 49-50. 
62 Id., p. 78 
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2.4 The software industry 
One of many arguments in the software patent debate is that software is far 
from suitable for patent protection due to the nature of the industry in which 
they exist. Innovation in the software industry runs at a fast pace, and the 
life cycle of a software product or process is often, but not always, fairly 
short and replaced every few years with an updated version.63 Product 
updates are constantly demanded and produced. Think for example on the 
frequency at which Microsoft makes available a new version of its Windows 
OS. Windows XP was released in 2001 and was recently ‘replaced’ by 
Windows Vista in 2007, leaving a mere six years of life before being 
replaced by a successor. And these six years are fairly long compared to the 
one year that passed between Windows XP and its predecessor Windows 
2000. One to six years is not a very long life, and it may seem 
disproportionate to the 20-year patent life. The new software is often built 
on the knowledge and the code of the older versions, making the 
developments in the software industry incremental and sequential with 
contributions made in small steps by different researchers. Guellec points 
out that it is mainly the production of software that works in this way where 
pieces are put together into a finished product, but that innovation is 
different and should be separated from the production.64 This reasoning has 
implications for how the incentives mechanism works in relation to software 
development, which will be further discussed in the following. 
 
Standardization is an important feature in the software industry. Standards 
are welfare enhancing where they allow economies of scale to lower costs of 
production. Standardization is often a result of network effects and need for 
interoperability in the software industry. Network effects are present when 
usability of one consumer is increased by a growing number of other users. 
Standardization is beneficial in many ways to consumers, because it e.g. 
provides for software products that work on different hardware, and 
facilitates for easier after-sales services where all software may be 
compared. It may, however, result in competition problems when, for 
example one software manufacturer holds patents for many products and 
processes made into industry standards, thus shutting out competition for 
fear of infringement or too high licensing costs. The standards may then be 
used as a barrier to entry for competition. Standards are also detrimental 
when they are set by a sub-optimal product or process, and the market is 
then locked-in. Or because is gives less technical diversity to consumers. 
Many would argue that Microsoft Windows, which is as much a standard as 
you may find, is not the optimal operating system on the market, but due to 
it being set it is difficult to change, and consumers are ‘locked in’ to a 
standard which is not the best possible.65  
                                                 
63 Burk, Dan and Mark Lemley – Designing Optimal Software Patents, Stanford Law 
School – Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series Research Paper No. 108, 2005, 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=692044, p. 90. 
64 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, p. 127. 
65 Id., pp. 105-106. 
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For the sequential improvements and the standards to work properly, the 
software industry requires openness and interoperability of standards. 
Interoperability concerns the ability of two pieces of technology to work 
together e.g. the multitude of software pieces that make up what is 
Microsoft Windows and its applications. Interoperability, or compatibility is 
an essential characteristic of software – compatibility with hardware, with 
other software etc. A word processing computer program that does not work 
on the OS would be useless and worthless. So would a word processing 
program which is not compatible with other users’ word processing 
programs, an illustration of the network effects. 
 
In sum, the software industry is characterized by short market lives, 
importance for standards and network effects for necessary interoperability 
of products on the market.  
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3 ”Trivial” Software Patents 
Triviality in software patents is a question of quality; what standard should 
have to be achieved to offset the negative consequences of being granted an 
exclusive right to exploit a product or process, which in an optimally 
efficient market would be provided for free? Much concern is directed 
towards the possibility of there being too many trivial software patents 
granted in Europe, thanks in large parts to the development in the US (see 
Section five). With the objective of the patent system in mind, and the 
economic idea that patents should only be granted if beneficial to society, 
the quality problem is given an economic foundation. When trivial patents 
are granted, they will incur costs on society that are not offset by their 
potential benefits – which makes them undesirable from an economic 
perspective. 
3.1 What is a “trivial” patent? 
Depending on the perspective, the definition of a “trivial” patent differs 
somewhat. The legal definition in the European patent system, which will be 
used in the following, is “novel, but lacking inventive step.” More 
informally it is “a patent that describes a small but insignificant advance 
over the state of the art”.66 There is general consensus that trivial patents are 
common in the software industry, something that may be explained by 
different factors. First of all, the patent examiners at the patent offices are 
not familiar with this relatively new field of technology and are possibly not 
entirely equipped to deal with it yet. It is difficult for the patent examiners to 
keep up to date with the state of the art in this fast moving industry, and 
effectively compare computer programs with each other to find the 
inventive step required.67 Combined with the nature of the process by which 
software is developed, risks of granting patents to inventions lacking 
inventive step may be increased. There may also be a problem in the rules to 
be applied, if they are not sufficient it is rather impossible for the examiner 
to apply them. These two problems are brought together by the fact that 
assessment of inventive step does, as current law looks, leave room for 
interpretation and when the examiner is not sure what is to be expected, the 
rules will not be applied properly, leaving room for less inventive software 
to ‘slip through’. 
 
Guellec describes three different main perspectives that can be used in 
assessing patent quality: the legal, technical and economic notions of a 
“quality patent”. The legal sense of a quality patent is one that looks to the 
extent to which there is legal certainty, i.e. if it is probable that the patent 
will be upheld in court because the examiner has interpreted and applied the 
law correctly. The technical sense is that the subject matter upholds the right 
                                                 
66 Bergstra and Klint, p. 264. 
67 Gratton, p. 240.   
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level of novelty and height; no prior art should be missed, and inventive step 
must be carefully assessed. Legal uncertainty has negative effects on 
competition and investment and low technical quality undermines 
competition and increases business risk. The economic notion of a quality 
patent takes the assessment one step further. Although an economically 
qualitative patent requires both legal and technical quality, it also requires 
the patent to be efficient. A patent, which is in line with the law, hence 
offering legal and technical quality, may be seen as low quality from the 
economic perspective if it does not encourage innovation or limits diffusion 
of knowledge, due to a too low inventive step or too broad scope.68 A patent 
that provides the wrong incentives for innovation, despite being legally 
correct, is not socially efficient to grant. The three notions of quality are 
rather intertwined and should be taken in assessment together. 
3.2 Inventive step 
The requirement for inventive step is set out in Article 52(1) EPC. What is 
signifying an inventive step is that the invention is not obvious (meaning 
that which “follows plainly or logically” from the prior art) to a person 
skilled in the art69 having regard to the state of the art70. Before 
assessment for inventive step comes into question, it has to already have 
been established that the subject matter is in fact an invention, in the sense 
of Article 52(1), and that it is novel.71 Where novelty requires the claims to 
distinguish the subject matter from separate parts of the state of the art, there 
is inventive step if the invention is non-obvious on basis of the state of the 
art as a whole. The interpretation of the term inventive step and the standard 
to which it is to be used has been left up to the EPO.72 In general, the 
patentee should be able to rely on an invention being granted a patent to 
have sufficient inventive step to be, with “a fair degree of certainty”, upheld 
in court.73
 
The extent of the difference between the invention and the state of the art 
determines the inventive step, a difference that should be significant and 
essential to the invention. The examiner should see to how technically 
difficult it was on the date of the claim to take the step from the state of the 
art to the invention.74  
 
The requirement for inventive step emerged as a response to competition 
concerns. The purpose of the assessment is to avoid granting patents to 
                                                 
68 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, p. 115. 
69 Article 54(2) EPC. 
70 The ‘state of the art’ is defined as: "everything made available to the public by means of 
a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the 
European patent application". See Article 54(2) EPC. 
71 Paterson, p. 536. 
72 Visser, Derk – The Annotated European Patent Convention, 13th revised edition 2000, p. 
77. 
73 AECI/Thermoplastics sockets (T1/81) O.J. EPO 1981, 439; [1979-85] E.P.O.R.: B: 273. 
74 Domeij, p. 82. 
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predictable and natural progressions. If simple novelty is required, any 
routine improvement could be monopolized, it would block the ordinary 
business development of the company that did not come up with the 
solution first.75 If patents on these simple improvements that any person in 
that industry could make, troublesome lock-ups will arise in the industry, 
and the patent system will have failed its goal of incentivizing innovation. 
The type of improvements one is trying to avoid granting patents to, 
correspond to those that the skilled man in the art would have made on the 
date of the application.76  
3.2.1 Person skilled in the art 
For an invention to have inventive step, the person skilled in the art should 
not be able to, at the date of the application and with basis in the state of the 
art, arrive at anything falling within the claim. If he can, the invention is to 
be considered obvious.77 The person skilled in the art is a fictitious person, 
with certain knowledge and abilities, who will determine the standard for 
obviousness.78 Many characteristics have been attributed to this person. He 
is not the public at large; neither is he a high level scientist. He is a 
specialist in his field,79 and at the same time his knowledge may not be 
extended unrealistically.80 He has no fantasy or creativity;81 he simply 
knows what is common general knowledge in his field. Furthermore,  
 
“generally accepted definitions of the notional ‘skilled person in the 
art’ […] have one thing in common, namely that none of them 
suggests that he is possessed of any inventive capability”.82  
 
Essentially, he is an ordinary practitioner in a specific technical field with 
the prior art in that field as his source of information. The only clarity 
brought to the level of skill of the skilled man in the technical field of 
software is that he should not be a “programming specialist”.83 When the 
knowledge of the skilled person falls short, he should go outside the specific 
field of technology to which the invention belongs, and search patent 
literature on the subject and related fields, where similar problems occur. In 
especially research intense industries, such as the software industry, the man 
skilled in the art is possibly a group of people rather than one single person; 
otherwise the assessment would be too simplistic and too many patents 
would be granted.84
                                                 
75 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, pp. 37-38. 
76 Domeij, p. 83. 
77 EPO Guidelines, C-IV 9.4. 
78 Visser, p. 78. 
79 EPO Guidelines, C-IV 9.3. 
80 Domeij, p. 84. 
81 EPO Guidelines, C-IV, 9.3. 
82 Paterson, p. 546; quoting ALLIED COLLOIDS/Polymer powders (T39/93) O.J. EPO 
1997, 134; [1997] E.P.O.R. 347. 
83 EPO Guidelines, C-II 4.14a. 
84 Domeij, p. 84. 
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3.2.2 Problem and solution approach 
The only established procedure for evaluating inventive step in the EPO is 
the problem and solution approach, which has its legal basis in rule 27(1)(d) 
EPC.85 It is the official policy of the first instance departments of the EPO 
and is almost always applied by the Boards of Appeal86 - the EPO 
Guidelines state that in practice, “the examiner should normally apply” the 
approach.87 The procedure is aimed at standardizing the assessment to some 
extent, by bringing objectivity and predictability to it, and reducing the 
potential use of hindsight. It was thought that simply asking whether the 
invention was obvious to a person skilled in the art was too general and 
subjective a question.  
 
The problem and solution approach is based on three steps: first, the 
technical field and the closest prior art are determined; second, the technical 
problem to be solved is established; and lastly, starting from the closest 
prior art and the technical problem, it is ascertained whether the claimed 
invention would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art.88 The 
steps effectively bring together the separate requirements for inventive step 
into one single test.  
 
The closest prior art is, in practice, generally that which corresponds to a 
similar use and has the most relevant technical features in common with the 
invention. It may in many cases be what is most closely concerned with the 
problem underlying the claimed invention. The closest prior art must be 
selected from the objective practical view of a skilled person in the art at the 
filing date.89 When finding, and starting, from the closest prior art, there is 
no need for consideration of the inventiveness compared to any other prior 
art. This approach is used to find a consistent standard, which is highly 
desirable goal for the public confidence in the inventiveness of subject 
matter being granted a patent.90  
 
To establish the objective technical problem, the examiner must first 
determine it, examine how the inventor solved it, and then decide on the 
obviousness. If no objective technical problem can be found, there can be no 
contribution to the art and thus, no inventive step.  
 
“When assessing inventive step […], it is not a question of the 
subjective achievement of the inventor, so that the case history of the 
invention […] is irrelevant […].”  
 
                                                 
85 “[D]isclose the invention, as claimed, in such terms that the technical problem and its 
solution can be understood.” For case law see, e.g., T20/81 O.J. EPO 1982, 217 and 
BASF/Metal refining (T24/81) O.J. EPO 1983, 133; [1979-85] E.P.O.R.: B: 354. 
86 Paterson, p. 536. 
87 EPO Guidelines, C-IV 9.8. 
88 Id. 
89 Paterson, p. 540. 
90 Id., p. 539.  
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The subjective problem formulated in the claim may need to be 
reformulated in light of objectively more relevant elements originally not 
taken into account.91 Important in assessing inventive step is to take the 
starting point at the closest prior art and not at the invention, to avoid 
hindsight. However, using the knowledge of the invention is inevitable 
when deciding the closest prior art. Extreme care must be taken in this 
regard. The requirement for the invention to make a technical contribution 
to the art has a close relation to this step of the problem and solution 
approach, because technical contribution entails a concrete solution to a 
certain practical problem. If the claim does not have a prima facie technical 
character the claim should be rejected – lack of inventive step have been 
established sufficiently.92
 
The objective technical problem is the problem that a skilled person would 
objectively recognize as the problem when comparing the closest prior art to 
the technical effect of the claimed invention.93 In the last step, if the person 
skilled in the art would have been prompted to modify or adapt the closest 
prior art to anything falling within the claim, there is obviousness.94 For the 
purposes of this test, the invention must be considered as a whole.95 The 
skilled person may only be defined after the objective technical problem has 
been established, otherwise the technical field may be wrong. 
3.2.3 Secondary indicia 
There are a number of ‘objective circumstances’, that can be perceived as 
indicators of inventive step, which have been established in case law.96 A 
general opinion in the field that the presented solution was not possible can 
be one of those indicators. So can commercial success, as long as the 
success is due to the technical qualities of the invention and not e.g. 
marketing.97 New and surprising technical advantage of an invention, which 
is of significant technical value, may be yet another indicator of inventive 
step.98
 
In the assessment for inventive step, it is of great importance how 
significant the problem was. A considerable technical step indicates 
inventive step, especially in research-intense fields.99 Inventive step is 
found lacking when the invention appears to be a predictable modification 
of something known and there is no surprising effect. An example is when 
something, which has previously been performed manually, is done by 
                                                 
91 Paterson, pp. 541-542; quoting BASF/Metal refining (T24/81) O.J. EPO 1983, 133; 
[1979-85] E.P.O.R.: B: 354 and ALLIED COLLOIDS/Polymer powders; see fn 82. 
92 EPO Guidelines, C-IV 2.3.6. 
93 Paterson, p. 543. 
94 Would is to be distinguished from could, which would give less weight to the last step. 
See EPO Guidelines, C-IV 9.8.3. 
95 EPO Guidelines, C-IV 9.8. 
96 Id., C-IV 9.10; Domeij, p. 89. 
97 Id., C-IV 9.10.4; Domeij, p. 91. 
98 Id., C-IV 9.10.2. 
99 Domeij, p. 87. See T192/82 O.J. EPO 1984, 415. 
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automatic means, unless some specific difficulty has been overcome or there 
is a surprisingly great result.100   
3.3 Disclosure and diffusion of 
technology 
One of the benefits of the patent system in general is that it promotes the 
disclosure of technology. The patent holder trades the publication of his 
invention for the exclusivity granted by the patent, thus disclosing 
inventions to other inventors and enhancing efficiency by reducing the risk 
of re-invention of already invented products and processes. Furthermore, 
disclosure facilitates further development of the patented products and 
inventing around of them for provision of substitutes, thus bringing about 
positive effects for consumers, such as reduction in market prices and 
greater product variety.101  
 
Critics of software patents argue that in the software industry, the disclosure 
effect of the patent system may be less important because most product and 
processes, once put on the market, will, due to the public good 
characteristics, be easily reverse-engineered, decompiled and invented 
around without need for disclosure. The problem with this argumentation is 
that if inventions are kept secret instead of patented, the competitors of the 
original inventor are more likely to simply duplicate the invention rather 
than coming up with new inventions by inventing around the original 
invention.102 Patents are therefore desirable in that they force competitors to 
provide original solutions due to the risk of otherwise infringing existing 
patents.103 The requirement for disclosure may conversely have negative 
effects when inventors prefer to keep their inventions secret for as long as 
possible due to the knowledge that once put on the market, the software 
product or process will be easily invented around. For example, Google has 
stated that “[a] lot of our best ideas don’t get filed as patents because patents 
eventually become public”104 providing a picture of how the companies may 
think in regards to disclosure. What may be concluded is that conflicting 
results arise from the disclosure that follows with a patent application. 
                                                 
100 Domeij, p. 88. 
101 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, p. 75. 
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4 Proposed CII Directive 
 The European Commission was induced to take action in the field of 
software patents after a Green Paper on the Community Patent105 in 1997 
and its follow-up in 1999.106 The Commission launched a round of 
consultations in 2000 and the response showed diverging opinions, 
however, the need for action was clear. A proposal for a Directive on 
patentability of computer-related inventions (CII Directive) was presented 
by the Commission in 2002.  
 
“The proposal for a Directive on the patentability of computer-
implemented inventions aims at harmonizing the provisions of 
national patent law dealing with inventions which rely on computers 
for their performance. The Directive will bring under the supervision 
of the European Court of Justice the rules applicable by national 
courts and patent offices charged with assessing the validity of patents 
and applications in this field.”107
 
Seemingly, the CII Directive sought to create a uniform set of rules for 
patentability for computer-related inventions in order to avoid divergences 
in the interpretation of software patents granted by the EPO and by national 
patent offices.  
 
“[…] a computer-implemented invention may be protected in one 
Member State but not in another one, which has direct negative effects 
on the proper functioning of the internal market. This Directive 
addresses this situation by harmonizing national patent laws with 
respect to the patentability of computer-implemented inventions and 
by making the conditions of patentability more transparent.”108  
 
The Directive was thus to provide for legal certainty for patent applicants, 
patent holders and potential infringers. Moreover, it would bring positive 
effects to the Common Market. The idea was to codify the current practice 
of the EPO and the Boards of Appeal case law, not to make substantial 
material changes to software patent law. The proposal included definitions 
of the essential terms “computer-implemented invention” and “technical 
contribution”, however notably not for “technical”.109  
                                                 
105 Promoting Innovation through patents: Green Paper on the Community Patent and the 
Patent System in Europe COM(1997) 314 final, 24 June 1997.  
106 Promoting innovation through patents: the follow-up to the Green Paper on Community 
Patent and the patent system in Europe COM(1999) 42 final, 5 February 1999. 
107 2002/0047 (COD) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 251(2) of the EC Treaty concerning the 
common position of the Council on the adoption of a directive of the European Parliament 
and Council on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions. 
108 Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 2-3. 
109 Article 2, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
patentability of computer-implemented inventions. 
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After the Commission drafted its first version of the CII Directive in 2002 
and a long first reading, during which substantial amendments were made to 
the Commission proposal, the final resolution was taken in September 2003. 
In May 2004 the Council came to an agreement on a common position, 
which was not adopted until early 2005. The EP then called for a restart of 
the consultation process by the Council, and the second reading was 
performed later that same year, after which the CII Directive was dismissed 
by a large majority, with 648 out of 732 MEPs voting against it.  
 
As for the parts of the CII Directive important for inventive step, the 
definition of “technical character” was proposed to be  
 
“a contribution to the state of the art in a technical field which is not 
obvious to a person skilled in the art”.  
 
Furthermore, this requirement was not to be a substitution for Article 56 
EPC, but a qualification of it. The Explanatory Memorandum also states that 
the assessment is to be made under the search for inventive step.110
 
There was definitely a great divergence in opinions on the appropriateness 
of a CII Directive, and it was given more attention than most proposals for 
Directives in the past. According to the consultations made by the 
Commission, the largest group opposed to software patents was the open 
source movement, however, about half the respondents were in fact in favor 
of software patents.111 It seems as though in the end, the major lobbying of 
the anti-software patent groups, such as the open source movement, was 
successful and influenced the EP to vote against the proposal. Thus, the EU 
stands today without uniform rules for patentability of software, but there is 
by no means silence on the subject. The dismissal of the CII Directive has 
certainly had a great impact on the attention given to it in the EU in recent 
years. There has been debating on the subject consistently since 2005; 
however, the efforts to regulate the area on the EU level have been put on 
ice for now, as the Commissioner for Internal Market and Services put it in 
a speech in 2006:  
 
“The vote and the far-reaching debate which preceded it 
demonstrated, in my opinion, that the time is not ripe for a meaningful 
piece of legislation to be adopted on this issue.”112
 
                                                 
110 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 13. 
111 The results of the European Commission Consultation Exercise on the Patentability of 
Computer Implemented Inventions, Final Report by PbT Consultants, under contract 
number PRS/2000/A0-7002/E/98, p. 4. 
112 Charlie McCreevy, Closing remarks at public hearing on future patent policy, (see fn 3). 
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5 Software Patents in US Law 
There has been much concern expressed in Europe over trivial software 
patents and its implications for the patent system as a whole. The opponents 
of software patents in Europe tend to look at the development in the US in 
recent years, where the patentability criterion of obviousness (the 
corresponding requirements of inventive step in US law) for software has 
been reduced to insignificance. This has led to an over-flow of trivial 
patents and a significant loss of trust in the patent system. However, there 
are differences in US and EPO law and practice, and there is no reason to 
believe that EU legislation would provide for a path down the same road as 
the US.  
5.1 General patentability criteria 
 The statutory requirements for patentability in US law are similar to the 
ones in the EPC. The US Patent Act requires first of all that the subject 
matter be statutory, that means basically that it is a product or process and 
that it does not fall into any of the excluded categories. Furthermore, subject 
matter has to fulfill the requirements of utility, novelty and non-
obviousness. Title 101 of 35 U.S.C. states that  
 
“[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to 
the conditions and requirements of this title.”113  
 
Titles 102 and 103 provide the conditions for patentability. Novelty is meant 
as something that is distinguishable from prior art114 and the subject matter 
has to be non-obvious to a person skilled in the art.115  
 
The excluded categories of subject matter have, in case law, been said to be 
laws of nature, scientific phenomena and mathematical formulae. These 
categories have been excluded due to it, according to courts, granting 
unreasonable control to individuals to grant exclusive rights such 
fundamental “scientific truths”.116 The general understanding that “anything 
goes” in the US may in large parts be because of such cases as Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty117 in which it was stated that “anything under the sun, made by 
man”  should be patentable.  
 
The corresponding requirement for inventive step in US patent law is that 
                                                 
113 US Patent Act 35 U.S.C. §101. 
114 Id. §102. 
115 Id. §103. 
116 Mackay Radio & Telecommunication Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) at 
94.  
117 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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for non-obviousness.118 Title 103 states: 
 
“(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this 
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole 
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter 
pertains [...].” 
 
This requirement asks the invention not to be obvious to a person skilled in 
the art, much like the requirement for inventive step in the EPC.  The 
difference, essentially, is the requirement for technical contribution that has 
been developed in EPO practice, which is not in any way present in US law. 
The differences does not lie so much in the legal texts, but in the way they 
are applied by the courts, which will be shown in the following more 
specifically regarding software. 
5.2 Patentability of software 
 Patentability of software in the US patent system has been developed 
through case law. Hesitation was at first shown towards this particular 
subject matter in the early seventies. In the Gottschalk v. Benson case,119 the 
Supreme Court stated that a mathematical algorithm itself was not 
patentable. However, they did not intend to exclude computer programming 
from patentable subject matter. Some ten years later, in 1981, in the 
Diamond v. Diehr case120 it was concluded that an invention could not be 
denied a patent solely on the grounds that its claims contained mathematical 
formulae.  
 
In the State Street Bank case121 the Court found that the previously applies 
exceptions from patentability for mathematical formulae and business 
methods were to be abandoned. The Court quoted the In re Alappat case122 
that had stated that an invention was patentable if it produced ”useful, 
concrete and tangible result[s]” and thereby made mathematical formulae 
patentable under these conditions. This because it was found that it was 
more appropriate to focus on the practical utility of the claimed subject 
matter rather than on its category. The WMS Gaming case123 somewhat 
limited State Street by stating that algorithms are patentable when they limit 
a general-purpose computer to a specific use, performing functions pursuant 
to the software. This was furthered by the statement that   
                                                 
118 See section 3.2. 
119 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 62 (1972). 
120 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
121 State Street Bank & Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group 149 F.3d 1368, (Fed. 
Cir. 1998). 
122 In re Alappat, 33 F3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
123 WMS Gaming Inc. v. International Game Technology, 184 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
quoting In re Alappat, fn 122. 
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“the scope of [title] 101 [is] to be the same regardless of the form – 
machine or process – in which a particular claim is drafted”124  
 
in the AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications Inc. case.125 Two recent cases 
in the CAFC have brought up the problem of obviousness in connection to 
software patents: Lockwood v. American Airlines126 and Amazon.com v. 
Barnesandnoble.com127 where obviousness was viewed as a substantial 
hurdle for software patenting, however not insurmountable. 
 
When making a comparison, however shallow, with the EPO system, one 
may conclude that there are stricter criteria in the European system, 
especially because of the requirement for technical character, which adds 
another dimension to the assessment. To say that, because laws are less 
strict in the US and because the practice at the USPTO may need revision, 
there is cause for hindering software patents in the EU is wrong. Caution 
should definitely be taken, and there is reason to learn from the ‘mistakes’ 
of the US, but it does not automatically mean that the EPO or a similar EU 
body would be unable to make correct assessments in line with what should 
be required of a software invention to ensure quality. It is surely so that the 
US legislator did not mean for trivial software patents to flood the market, it 
has happened due to other circumstances, outside the scope of this thesis. 
Neither does it mean that the US rules are necessarily bad, simply badly 
applied. Thus, to make the assumption that Europe will inevitably go the 
same way as the US cannot be correct if one has any faith in the ability of 
the European patent examiners to learn from experience and to adjust to a 
new market.   
                                                 
124 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications Inc., 172 F3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
125 Schechter, Roger and John Thomas, Principles of Patent Law, 2nd ed. Concise 
Hornbooks, pp. 42-48. 
126 Lockwood v. American Airlines, 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
127 Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com, 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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6 Analysis 
“To determine if software patents should exist, one must balance the 
incentive to innovate that software patents provide versus the 
frequency with which potentially obvious software patents may 
arise.”128
 
Looking to the rationale of the patent system as a whole, its two clearly 
stated main objectives are to provide incentives for innovation and to 
facilitate diffusion of technology. It is a generally accepted understanding 
that patents do provide these incentives in most industries – “a high patent 
activity is generally considered a sign of economic health”,129 it is merely a 
question of it being more or less pronounced.    
 
As for the software industry, it is likewise undisputed that innovation in 
software is essential and wanted for technological and economical growth. 
In today’s society, there is an obvious demand and need for an endless 
number of products using software, such as aircrafts, cars, mobile phones 
and personal computers, to name a few. Software patenting is however 
controversial. Certain groups claim that patents are directly harmful to 
innovation in and the quality of software.130 Furthermore, it has been stated 
that current IP law has not taken software into consideration, and therefore 
the law itself may not be suitable.131 On the other hand, others say that the 
software industry is in principle no different than other industries and that it 
just needs to mature and will then adjust to the conditions of the patent 
system.  
 
With the concerns for the quality of software patents being so pronounced, it 
becomes increasingly important to make sure that the expressed goal of 
maintaining high quality in European patents is in fact lived up to also with 
respect to software patents. The question of inventive step is particularly 
interesting in this relation because, where most claims concerning software 
will pass the invention criteria without substantial problems, or fail on the 
ground that it is a mathematical method, rather than a computer program “as 
such”,132 the standard-setting for software patentability falls on the 
examiners in determining novelty and inventive step. 
                                                 
128 Yang, Grant C. – The Continuing Debate of Software Patents and the Open Source 
Movement, 13 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 171, at 205. 
129 Bakels and Hugenholtz, p. 5. 
130 E.g. the Free and Open Source Software movements. 
131 Zoracki, at 581. 
132 The computer program ‘as such’ is as good as nonexistent. 
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6.1 Incentives for innovation 
The requirement for inventive step, as it is set out in the EPC,133 provides no 
room for an evaluation of an appropriate level for its assessment – it is 
simply a question of, “yes, there is” or “no, there is not” inventive step. 
However, in a law and economics setting such as patent law, there is almost 
always a tradeoff to be made, making ‘yes and no’ questions too simplistic.  
 
There is in this context of economic law a level of inventive step that is 
socially efficient, and that level should be pursued because it is the level at 
which the best possible incentives for innovation are facilitated for. Since 
there is a myriad of different interests and circumstances influencing 
incentives, intricate work is required to weigh and balance these interests 
and circumstances against each other in the determination of whether 
particular software is sufficiently inventive. The level of inventiveness must 
be adequately high not to grant patent protection to trivial software 
inventions that is detrimental to innovation. On the other hand, the extent of 
the inventive step assessment cannot be so rigorous as to incur costs that are 
higher than the costs of a few trivial patents.   
6.1.1 Appropriate level of inventive step 
When a low level of inventive step is required for software patents, many 
patents will be granted and there will be increased competition in the 
market. Increased competition may at first be seen as a good thing as it may 
create incentives for providing the best product or process. Assuming that 
the consumer knows what he wants and knows how to pick the best product 
(this is probably especially true for software), then low quality software will 
be pushed out of the market. With the massive flow of information available 
about software products, it is increasingly difficult for a low quality 
software product to make it in the market. On the other hand, increased 
competition leaves the inventor with a lower expected return on investment 
made, since there will be more competing products to share the market with. 
This effect will lower incentives for innovation. Hunt points out that this is 
an effect that is more pronounced in high technology industries,134 thus 
providing an argument against the relaxing of patentability criteria of 
inventive step for software. This argument may however be reversed for a 
different perspective: where an invention lacking inventive step, and of low 
quality is granted a patent, it may not be so harmful, because the older 
product will prevail due to being the one of higher quality. Yet another 
problem with a low level of inventive step is that the lower the quality of the 
granted patents, the more likely software developers may try to file their low 
quality products, disregarding the negative implications this has for the 
patent system as a whole, because they know that other poorly inventive 
products have obtained patent protection. This increase in low quality patent 
                                                 
133 See section 3.2 and Supplement. 
134 Hunt, Robert M. – You Can Patent That? Are Patents on Computer Programs and 
Business Methods Good for the New Economy?, Business Review Q1 ( (2001), p. 11. 
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applications will put further strains on an already burdened patent office and 
there is an increased risk of trivial patents being granted, leading to a 
downwards spiral of lower quality patents being granted and thus creating 
more negative incentives for quality of the inventions being claimed.  
 
Conversely, with a high level of inventive step required, fewer patents will 
be granted and the expected returns on software innovation will be lower as 
well, but the incentive to produce quality products is higher since the one 
with the best product will gain the patent and the market.135 Supposing that 
an invention only brings returns as long as it is not subject to competition by 
new technology, by which it will most likely be pushed out of the market, 
the economic life of the patent is shorter the heavier the innovation rate is in 
the specific industry. Since innovation in the software industry is fairly 
quick, the expected life of a patent should be short and there is less time for 
the inventor to recoup his investment costs. It is therefore, e.g. important 
that what is patented is truly living up to a high level of inventive step so 
that no invention can out-maneuver another without it rightfully doing so 
and gain a market advantage that is unfair in terms of pushing out a previous 
high quality invention.136 A high level of inventive step may also be 
warranted due to the signaling effect of patents, it is important that other 
inventors do not get the signal from granted patents that low quality is 
acceptable. Furthermore, because of the diffusion of technology that takes 
place when patents are granted, it could be significant whether the 
technology spread is of high or low quality. This is so because if other 
inventors see the grant of a patent as a signal of quality, and believes that the 
patented software maintains a certain quality standard, they may use that as 
a starting point for further development or inventing around, and will thus 
end up inventing on a sub-optimal level of inventiveness, due to their 
starting point being set by the wrong standard. 
 
In the legal sense, it is important to set a quality level of software patents 
that is possible to maintain for the respect of the patent system not to be lost. 
The exact optimal level of inventive step to require is a matter for 
economists to calculate. Arguments can obviously be made in both the 
directions of requiring low or high levels of inventive step, but the general 
consensus seems to be that lower inventive step makes for lower quality in 
patents, which in the long run is detrimental to the incentives mechanism 
that the patent system is instated to facilitate. The long run advantages of 
requiring a high level of inventive step for software products and processes 
are more convincing to me. A fairly high level of inventive step is required 
to maintain quality in software patents and it seems the bad effects of a low 
level threshold for inventive step are worse than the possible incentive-
raising effect of lowering the standard – which could make things worse 
still, and reduce incentives in the long run because of the lowered chance of 
recoupment of R&D investment costs where there are more patented 
products to compete with. 
                                                 
135 Hunt, Robert M. – Economics and the Design of Patent Systems, 13 Michigan 
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review 457, 2007, at 459. 
136 Id., at 459. 
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In sum, a low level of inventive step may, in the short run provide for a 
quicker process of patentability with more patents being let through and 
possibilities of quickly recouping R&D investment costs. Something that is 
positive for the inventor as the fast pace of innovation in software makes for 
uncertainty as to for how long a patent is valuable to the market. However, 
in the long run a high level of inventive step required, the process may be 
more dubious, but the patents that come out of it will be of a higher quality, 
which provides for better incentives for further innovation because of higher 
prospective returns due to a better product that has a better chance of 
prevailing on the market for a longer time. These incentives for innovation 
in turn make for a more efficient patent system in the long run, and are what 
should be pursued in my opinion. 
6.1.2 Incremental innovation 
It is often argued that it is difficult to maintain quality in software patents 
because software is developed in increments and often built by the 
programmers on the work of each other. Even if an entirely new product 
fulfills the inventive step criterion, subsequent improvements may not be 
sufficiently inventive to warrant patent protection. I do not see, however, 
why this is a convincing argument against the patentability of all software. 
Rather, I agree with Domeij, who makes the point that the patent system 
itself is adjusted to the general incremental development of technology, 
where inventors build on the results of each other.137 In fact, most 
inventions in most fields are built on previous knowledge, so that the 
software industry would be much different in this respect is not well 
founded.138 Campbell-Kelly argues, correctly in my view, that software 
patents are not so different from those in other technologies and therefore, 
the software industry will adjust, like other areas of technology has, to a 
patent regime. As long as the level of inventive step is kept at a sufficiently 
high level, which I believe it should (see section 6.1.1), it should be possible 
for any inventor who comes up with a technically sufficiently advanced 
invention, thus contributing to the art, to be granted a patent on his product, 
no matter what that product is. There is no reason in my mind to keep an 
inventor of new and useful software from gaining the same benefits of his 
innovative activity as any other inventors in any other field of technology. It 
may very well be so that no incremental developments will obtain patents, if 
the requirements are stricter than today, but the patent system should 
definitely be there for truly innovative inventions.. 
6.2 Clarity of rules for legal certainty 
For the incentivizing function of software patents, discussed above, to work 
properly and for the standard of inventive step required to be applied in an 
appropriate and optimal manner, it must be made clear what that standard is 
                                                 
137 Domeij, p. 52. 
138 Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, p.127. 
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and how to apply it. Legal certainty is of great importance for a qualitative 
patent system. Pre-grant, patentees have to be able to know that their 
invention is patentable and what is expected of it. Most importantly, the 
inventor will want to, to the extent possible, be able to predict whether 
investment costs may be returned, to be incentivized to invest in R&D in the 
first place. Thus, if there is not a sufficient level of predictability to what 
may happen with the patent and the invention, there will be less innovative 
activity. Further, it is essential to know what to expect post-grant, how the 
patent will be treated, e.g. in case of opposition or infringement litigation. 
 
There are, as may be deduced from the previous chapters, certain areas 
where the software patent law is not particularly clear. What may constitute 
patentable subject matter is particularly blurred in the software field and 
furthermore, the way in which inventive step is assessed is not always 
particularly reliable, even though there is an adopted approach to this – the 
problem and solution approach.  
 
Although the notion of “technical character” is neither an express 
requirement for patentability, nor necessarily a part of the assessment of 
inventive step, it certainly has great implications for the patentability 
assessment. As the notion was first construed, the “technical character” was 
easily attained and made little qualitative difference to the assessment for 
patentable subject matter. It was simply too easy to fulfill and was therefore 
abandoned. The way the notion of “technical character” influences 
patentability in its current form is through its close relationship to the 
assessment for inventive step, in which technical matters are taken very 
much into consideration.  
 
Technical character is furthermore very much influential in software patents 
because it is the field of technology in which it was developed and is 
essentially the only one where it is given any real weight.139 Because of the 
abstract and mental nature of the software code, and the possibly very 
tangible result of its implementation, the technicality requirement is used to 
make a distinction between patentable software (with “further technical 
effect”) and non-patentable software (“as such”). As a result, the inventive 
step requirement becomes increasingly important, as it is possible to show 
technical effect in almost any software product (not least by simply being 
clever in the patent application). Carefulness is called for, due to the risk of 
simply seeing the technical contribution made clear in the claim and taking 
that for the only ‘proof’ needed for inventive step.  
 
There is to some extent confusion as to what “technical character” means. 
The EPO itself has expressed that it is not clear, despite it being the EPO 
who ‘made up’ the term.140 It is therefore undoubtedly difficult for the 
patent applicants to know what is required of them, and for the examiner to 
                                                 
139 Booton points out that “technical character” is a so-called policy lever for the software 
industry, and is, despite it being given ‘universal’ application, in essence only applied in 
this field; See Booton, at 112. 
140 Booton, at 93. 
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know what to look for in claimed subject matter. Something that is difficult 
enough in the fast moving software industry, with new sub-fields emerging 
all the time. This is an interpretation problem, which leads to legal 
uncertainty that needs to be resolved. For more certainty and transparency of 
the system, codification of the concept of “technical character” is needed, 
whether it is to be applied as a separate requirement for patentability or as 
an added part to inventive step.141  
 
How to exactly specify “technical character” is difficult to answer, but it 
needs to be made sufficiently clear for the inventors to know what to expect, 
and for the examiners and the Boards of Appeal to apply the law in the same 
manner. This could be at least in part helped by harmonization of software 
patent law in the EU. This was also one of the aims of the proposed CII 
Directive – to provide a definition of technical character for the uniform 
application of what is considered inventions and the patentability 
requirement of inventive step. The potential difficulty that one uniform, 
rule-based application of the term “technical character” is not optimal for all 
industries should be mitigated by the fact that this concept is in reality only 
used in connection to software related products and processes. 
6.3 Examination procedure 
It is not only important that the inventive step requirement is set at an 
optimal level, and that the rules to be applied are sufficiently clear; for an 
efficient system the examination procedure has to be in conformity with the 
legal rules. The set standards for inventive step will be meaningless if the 
patent examiners do not know how, or do not have the right means, to apply 
them properly. Although the problem and solution approach is established 
for assessing inventive step that in itself is no guarantee for proper outcome 
in all cases since there are inherent problems in the approach, such as the 
probable, almost unavoidable, use of hindsight when setting out to find the 
technical problem. The approach has further been criticized because it may 
make the examiner lose track of the bigger picture, i.e. finding the overall 
technical contribution of the invention, instead of simple fitting the pieces 
together in the step-by-step method the approach is built on.142
6.3.1 The examiner 
Excessive strains on the patent offices are possible when new technologies 
emerge. Because the software industry is still relatively young, and because 
innovation runs at a fast pace the patent examiners have not yet had time to 
become as skilled as may be required in the long run. Along with the 
difficulty in keeping up to date with fast technological advances, the 
examination process may not be as good as it should optimally be – yet. 
                                                 
141 The legal foundation of such a practice is a matter of discussion not given room in this 
thesis. 
142 Reed, Chris and John Angel – Computer Law, Oxford University Press, 5th edition 2003, 
p. 171.  
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There are many who argue that the software industry is still young, and it 
will adjust, like most other industries have.  
 
The problems the patent examiners face are possibly enhanced by the 
increased workload provided by more and more filed patent applications. 
With increased workload comes the need for more examiners and more 
training for them, increasing the costs, and where resources are scarce, this 
factor may add on to the problems currently facing the patent offices. To 
keep training and hiring of patents examiners up to speed with the 
innovation and patent application speed may be difficult at this time. 
However, the examiner must at the very least be capable of ‘learning on the 
job’, so to speak, providing a starting point for better examination 
procedures. When patent examiners are not sufficiently trained in what they 
do, they will inevitably let at least a certain amount of trivial patents ‘slip 
through’, providing the incentive problems partially described in section 
6.4.1. Additionally, the patent offices are more likely to make mistake in 
fields of technology in which they have less experience, such as the 
software industry, thus increasing the risks of trivial software patents.143  
 
However, it seems a weak argument against patentability in itself, to deny 
any patents in this field due to lack of experience of the patent office, they 
should get up to date at least at some point not too far in the future. It seems 
to me that the short-term cost of training the patent examiners to better 
understand the technological field of software would be offset by the gains 
of, in the long run, more innovative activity due better incentives for 
innovation where patents granted hold a sufficient level of inventiveness 
and thus quality.  
6.3.2 The man skilled in the art 
Another required task of the patent examiner is to define and put himself in 
the place of the man skilled in the art. Simply defining this character may be 
an obstacle; this person cannot be defined until the technical field has been 
established. Otherwise the person may not be skilled in the right art. The 
patent examiner then faces the task of putting himself in the place of this 
skilled person and evaluating what he would have done with the knowledge 
of the prior art and the problem at hand. Furthermore, reconciliation 
between the skilled man and an examiner at the patent office may bring 
certain difficulties. The former being devoid of any human capabilities it 
seems, at least if one looks to the characteristics described in section 3.2.1, 
and the latter being a very human being who may be neither sufficiently 
skilled nor sufficiently objective. To attribute all the expected characteristics 
to this fictional person and then expect an actual person to think like that 
seems deemed to fail at the get-go. Considering the skilled man may be 
construed of a group of scientists in the software field may mitigate the 
problems to a certain extent.  
 
                                                 
143 Hunt (2001), p. 12. 
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Furthermore, there is often a discrepancy between the level of skill of the 
person skilled in the art and the real life computer programmers. Something 
that may infuse the idea of certain programmers that all software patents are 
trivial, because in their level of skill nothing is really significantly inventive 
or non-obvious. The common general knowledge at the basis of the 
assessment is therefore possibly incorrect, where the common general 
knowledge of the average computer programmer is significantly higher than 
that of the person skilled in the art personified by the patent examiner.  
 
A tradeoff has to be made here between the level of skill to demand of the 
skilled man and the risk of granting trivial patents – what is economically 
justifiable? To require the man skilled in the art to be at the level of the most 
skilled computer programmer would clearly not be so – the cost of 
recruiting computer programming specialists to the patent offices or to 
educate the examiners would be too high, and would most likely not be 
offset by the gain in level of quality in patents granted.  
6.3.3 Search for prior art  
Easier search for prior art needs to be facilitated for the examination 
procedure to go smoother. The examiner needs, e.g. for the purposes of 
finding the closest prior art when utilizing the problem and solution 
approach but also for determining novelty. Furthermore, the patent 
applicants would be helped and could to a greater extent be required, to 
include further prior art searches in their applications. Care should be taken 
though in requiring too much of the applicants since an extensive 
requirement for them to add prior art searches in their application could be 
too costly on their part, and also lead to an over-flow of work for the patent 
examiners in going through all the extra material. It may effectively be so 
that the current practice of requiring the applicant to include the known art, 
i.e. what he knows of prior art at the time of the application, is the best 
practice for the applicant.  
 
To help in the prior art search at the EPO level, granted and rejected patents 
may be a good starting point alongside private prior art databases used by 
both patent offices and software manufacturers.144 A prior art database for 
software patents is a costly project to set up, but would in all likeliness be 
advantageous to the examination procedure, but as long as resources are not 
found to develop one uniform database on the European level, the private 
databases should be sufficient. The crux is to induce all the software patent 
holders to submit their patents to the database, and also for the patent offices 
to submit denied patent information for a more complete search facility.  
                                                 
144 See, e.g. http://www.ip..com providing a prior art database, which is currently used by 
the EPO.  
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6.3.4 Ex ante vs. ex post control 
Because there is a risk of lower quality patents ‘slipping through’ the 
examination process, due to the factors discussed in the previous sections, it 
is important to look at whether there are circumstances that make this risk 
less serious. It can be said that the really low quality patents that do come 
through the examination process are rarely enforced, the holders of these 
patents knowing the lack of quality in them will be less inclined to 
aggressively assert their rights, and would not likely hold up in case of 
litigation. This provides an ex post mechanism of ensuring at least that bad 
quality patents are not blocking better products from emerging. Moreover, 
the opposition procedure facilitated for in the EPC may further mitigate the 
negative impact of some trivial patents in the software industry. However, 
all forms of ex post control must be weighed against ex ante mechanisms. It 
seems to me that for upholding a good level of quality in software patents, it 
is better to ensure the quality in granting the patent rather than letting them 
through the examination process, with the detrimental signals that sends to 
the software industry, for subsequent invalidation. In sum, the ex post 
control mechanisms should only be utilized in the, hopefully with a better 
examination process, rare cases where an insufficiently inventive invention 
is granted a patent.  This type of ex post control, with the exception for 
opposition, which is dealt with within the EPO, will be unpredictable as 
well because of the differences in practice of the national patent courts. 
6.4 Competition concerns 
Competition law and IP law are closely intertwined fields that affect each 
other to a great extent – they are opposites in a way – patents provide 
monopolies that competition law tries to prevent. When an exclusive right is 
provided in the shape of monopoly, obvious competition concerns arise. 
How to strike a balance between the two is no easy task. The monopoly in 
the case of patents, have been thought to be justified for the positive effects 
of patents to come forward. However, care should still be taken – if the 
monopoly is enhanced and imposes costs that are not offset by the 
stimulation of innovation and the diffusion of technology, it should possibly 
be reconsidered. 
 
Due to the network effects and the standardization inherent in the software 
industry, a first inventor who obtains a patent on a broad software invention 
may set a standard with the effect that the monopoly provided by the patent 
will not easily be amended at the end of the patent period. Hence, the 
previous monopolist retains an advantageous position towards competitors 
also after the end of the patent term. However, this calls for the competitors 
of the first patent holder to be even more inventive and find other solutions 
to the same problems. The point being that in industries where standards are 
easily set, as in the software industry, it is important that granted patents live 
up to a standard of inventiveness that justifies them in light of the fact they 
may be used for anti-competitive purposes and furthermore, may block 
 42 
other, better inventions from reaching the market. In the end, this would be 
detrimental to consumers who will have less access to high quality products. 
Moreover, consumers may hesitate in switching to the newer and better 
products because the network effects of the first, sub-optimal but 
standardized product has already ‘kicked in’, making it would be costly to 
switch to the new and better product.  
 
That trivial patents enhance the negative effects of the exclusive rights 
granted to a patent holder is unquestionable. However, there is a natural 
tendency towards monopoly in software even without patents because of the 
network effects displayed.145 Because there is a need for interoperability 
between different types of software and between software and hardware, it 
is most efficient to have one provider of all software and potentially 
hardware as well. These natural tendencies towards monopolies may be 
amplified by the patent system. For example, with personal computers, the 
one who controls the interface between the different pieces of software 
controls the market This is the current position of Microsoft, which controls 
the OS, the applications etc. and they use that power to gain a market 
advantage, sometimes in a way that puts them in a lot of trouble competition 
law wise.  
 
Notably, a concern of economic nature – the preservation of competition – 
resulted in the technical examination inherent in inventive step.146 This is an 
example of when competition concerns have contributed in the development 
of the rules for assessing inventive step. I do not believe that the 
competition problems connected to software patents are of such great 
consequence as to require a ban on these patents. However, care needs to be 
taken. Again, if the other parts of the process of assessing inventive step are 
kept up to par, the granting of software patents would most likely not 
worsen the competitive environment.  
6.5 The role of harmonization 
“Effective, transparent and harmonized protection of computer-
implemented inventions throughout the member states is essential in 
order to maintain and encourage investment in this field.”147
 
Harmonization of software patent law is highly desirable from the point of 
view of legal certainty.148 When an inventor applies for a patent with the 
EPO he may not be certain that the patent will hold up in the same way in 
all the contracting states of the EPO, or that it will even be enforceable at 
all, since national laws apply to the patents post-grant and the contracting 
states, who are not bound to the decisions of the EPO, do not all recognize 
                                                 
145 Bakels and Hugenholtz, p. 19. 
146 See section 3.2. 
147 Murphy, David – European Industry and Software Patents, Patent Eye, No. 1 pp. 17-25, 
2005, p. 24. 
148 This is an opinion that has been expressed by the Board of Appeal in the IBM/Computer 
Program Product I case, see fn 44. 
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software as patentable subject matter, even if all the statutory requirements 
for patentability are the same.149 For example, the UK is fairly strict in their 
application of patent laws to software related inventions, especially in 
comparison to Germany, where practice is more relaxed. A patent granted 
by the EPO, which is recognized in one state but not in another is a problem 
because a granted patent that cannot be enforced in the whole area for which 
it is sought, cannot be an optimal patent in the eyes of the patent holder, thus 
it certainly should be in the interest of all patent applicants that the effect of 
granted patents are the same in all of the contracting states. Divergences in 
practices of the national patent court leave the market with around 30,000 
software related patents whose enforceability cannot be guaranteed, and 
European industry may suffer for it.150 An international company faced with 
having to pick between a patent system where their patents are uniformly 
applied over the entire area, and a system where the application process may 
be uniform, but there is significant uncertainty as to what will happen to the 
patent after it has been granted, will most likely pick the former – thus not 
the European system. 
 
Legal certainty also extends to the interpretation of the laws, the ‘technical 
character’ requirement would benefit greatly from being rule-based rather 
than based loosely on EPO practice. Since the Boards of Appeal do not have 
any law-making powers as such, an actual codification of the term 
“technical character” would be impossible to obtain on the EPO level. This 
is another area where harmonization could facilitate for better solutions. 
Booton makes an important and good point in my opinion when he points 
out that unfortunately, due to the turbulent recent past of the debate over 
software patentability, it is unlikely that consensus could be reached, at this 
point, between all the bodies of the EU that are involved in the legislative 
process.151
 
Furthermore, harmonization would be beneficial from an economic 
perspective. First of all because economic considerations would be given 
more explicit weight on an EC law level, due in part to the fact that the EPC 
effectively denies the boards of appeal the right to make economic 
argumentation part of their assessment, but also because EC law has, or is at 
the very least moving towards, a practice of giving great weight to market 
conditions and other economic factors in several fields of law. Considering 
the inherent economic nature of software patent law, this would certainly be 
a step forward. The single market imperative of the European Common 
Market makes harmonization critical in an area, such as the software 
market, where trade between states is abundant.  
 
There are many positive aspects to be found in favor of harmonization. It is 
desirable from the viewpoint of legal certainty, it could help with conform 
interpretation of patentability requirements and it is economically efficient, 
                                                 
149 Explanatory memorandum, p. 9. 
150 Murphy, p. 20. 
151 Booton, at 113-114. 
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thus providing for all three quality notions for software patents.152 It seems 
as though going actively against harmonization of software patent law is 
rather ‘dumb’ since software patents are already being granted on a grand 
scale today. It would, in my mind, make more sense to put energy into 
making the harmonization process go in the right direction, rather than 
fighting a system that will not likely be changed to a ban on software 
patents, and which could be made better than what is now a software patent 
practice that grants trivial patents and is unpredictable where national rules 
differ greatly, at least in application.  
                                                 
152 See section 3.1. 
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7 Conclusions 
No matter what was originally intended with regards to patents on software 
when the EPC was drafted, interesting as that question may be in itself, 
computer programs and software are highly patentable subject matters under 
the European patent system today.  
 
A note-worthy question is whether software is really less suitable for 
patenting or just more controversial. A closer examination of what has been 
written about software patents in the past, it is striking how the controversy 
of the software patent in many ways is an idealistic war fought mainly by 
the (very loud) open and free software movements against the ‘big bad 
wolfs’ that are the handful of large software manufacturing corporations, 
predominantly Microsoft, that may be more visible in their patent activities 
than the multitude of smaller software developing firms. It is persistently 
held that because there is such a controversy, software patents must be bad. 
Claims of software patents being unable to hold sufficient quality and how 
all software is nothing but abstract mathematical formula and that it is built 
in increments, thus never providing large enough leaps of technological 
advancement to warrant patent protection. Not to say that there is nothing 
wrong with software patents, but one needs to look past the heavily 
subjective argumentation of certain critics that is often lacking substance.  
 
There are indeed apparent problems with software patents that need to be 
addressed for the future prosperity of software innovation. “Trivial” patents 
are clearly a problem that is especially pronounced in the software industry. 
Such patents are granted on a regular basis by poorly educated patent 
examiners and make the inherent inefficiencies of the patent system worse 
because they provide insufficient or wrong incentives for innovation and for 
patent applications. But rather than banning software patenting, there are 
amendments to make within the existing system. 
 
In line with what has been discussed in the previous, I find it strange, 
unreasonable even, that a risk of granting “trivial” patents should be 
anything other than a call for stricter examination or stricter and clearer 
criteria for patentability of software, possibly best achieved by 
harmonization of examination criteria – not a call for a ban on software 
patents. Granted, harmonization will not change much in the examination 
procedure since that is basically harmonized as it is on the European level. 
Harmonization would, however, make it possible to outright take into 
consideration economic concerns that are very much at the heart of patent 
law. Most importantly, harmonization would help in that it could bring 
national courts in line with each other and the European system, and make 
them bound by the same rules, thus improving legal certainty and 
predictability of the way in which a granted patent will be treated. Arguably, 
since computer software is in essence already patentable in the EU, with the 
exception of computer programs “as such”. Something that, with the 
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addition of the requirement for technical character, makes them as 
patentable as any other invention fulfilling the requirements of the EPC, it 
would help with a uniform legal instrument which brings with it legal 
certainty in the area of software patents. Furthermore, concerns that a 
harmonized EU legislation would bring the EU closer to the US in terms of 
bringing down the standards for patentability to a level where algorithms 
would be patentable in themselves are unfounded. Upholding standards in 
the EU assessment, in the same way that standards need to be raised for all 
other purposes as well, for granting high quality patents, could prevent this.  
 
Finally, I return to the question put at the beginning of this thesis, to bring it 
all together: is the problem with granting “trivial” patents a valid reason for 
the continued non-harmonization of software patent law in the EU? The 
simple and succinct answer would be “no”. However, as simply as the 
answer may be put, the road to it has been anything but easy.  
 
I cannot see the rationale behind leaving out a major part of what is 
technology, and important technology at that, for the reason that the specific 
industry is especially prone to lower standards at this point in time. Give it 
time to adjust, I propose, and put extra efforts into making the situation at 
hand better. This should be done by increasing the level of inventiveness 
required, setting a uniform standard for the assessment of inventive step by 
formalizing the “technical character” requirement so that it may be applied 
uniformly and provide legal certainty for the patent applicants. Discourage 
potential misuse of the patent system by overzealous computer programmers 
and abusive software manufacturers by requiring a level of inventiveness 
that makes natural progressions and small improvements to existing art 
unpatentable by not fulfilling the requirement for inventive step - not by 
failing on the ground of being unpatentable subject matter. Society as a 
whole benefits from software innovation, and I truly believe because we 
have a patent system that is already providing for software patents, it is a 
backwards move that would likely fail, to ban them now.  
 
I opt for higher demands for level of inventiveness in regards to software 
inventions and rely on the adjusting capabilities of the patent system and the 
examination process to this new field of technology. This would in my 
opinion be helped by EU level harmonization for software patents, an 
important field of technology whose inventors should not be deprived of the 
same protective functions as those in other fields of technology simply 
because the market has not yet quite found its way. 
 
As this field of law is still largely unexplored it is important that there is 
further study into what may be done in this interesting and developing area. 
For the future I would like to propose certain questions that may make for 
interesting research in the future: 
- What are the actual economic implications of software patentability 
for innovation and investment in R&D in the software industry? Is 
ex post or ex ante protection more economically efficient?  
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- Is the general patent system sufficient for software patent protection, 
or would a sui generis regulation be more appropriate, or simply 
redundant? 
- What level of skill should be required of the man skilled in the art 
when it comes to assessment of software inventions to provide for 
better levels of inventive step than can be found today? 
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Supplement 
Relevant EPC Articles: 
 
Article 52 – Patentable inventions 
 
(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions which are 
susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an 
inventive step. 
 
(2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the 
meaning of paragraph 1: 
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods; 
(b) aesthetic creations; 
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games 
or doing business, and programs for computers; 
(d) presentations of information. 
 
(3) The provisions of paragraph 2 shall exclude patentability of the subject 
matter or activities referred to in that provision only to the extent to which a 
European patent relates to such subject matter or activities as such. 
 
Article 54 - Novelty 
 
(1) An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the 
state of the art. 
(2) The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available 
to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any 
other way, before the date of filing of the European patent application. 
(3) Additionally, the content of European patent applications as filed, of 
which the dates of filing are prior to the date referred to in paragraph 2 and 
which were published under Article 93 on or after that date, shall be 
considered as comprised in the state of the art.  
(4) Paragraph 3 shall be applied only in so far as a Contracting State 
designated in respect of the later application, was also designated in respect 
of the earlier application as published. 
(5) The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not exclude the patentability of 
any substance or composition, comprised in the state of the art, for use in a 
method referred to in Article 52, paragraph 4, provided that its use for any 
method referred to in that paragraph is not comprised in the state of the art. 
 
Article 56 – Inventive Step 
 
An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having 
regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art. If 
the state of the art also includes documents within the meaning of Article 
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54, paragraph 3, these documents are not to be considered in deciding 
whether there has been an inventive step. 
 
Article 57 – Industrial Application 
 
An invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it 
can be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture. 
 
Articles of the Implementing Regulations to the EPC: 
 
Rule 27 
 
(1) The description shall 
(a) specify the technical field to which the invention relates;  
(c) disclose the invention, as claimed, in such terms that the technical 
problem (even if not expressly stated as such) and its solution can be 
understood, and state any advantageous effects of the invention with 
reference to the background art. 
 
Rule 29 
 
(1) The claims shall define the matter for which protection is sought in 
terms of the technical features of the invention. […] 
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